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egates should possess all information presented to the committee,
be assumed there was no objection to its being circulated.
The chairman said he feared it would not be possible to get all
these reports circulated in time to be examined and discussed
t11at afternoon, and if it was thought best the committee might
adjourn until the next morning.
Accordingly, the meeting ·was adjourned until Saturday, January
.
, 7, 1922, at 11 o'clock a. m.

SEVENTEENTH MEETING-SATURDAY, JANUARY 7, 1922, 11 A.M.
PRESENT.

United States.-1\Jlr. :Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator
Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by
Mr. 'Vright, Mr. Clark.
British Empire.-Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes,
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada) ,
Senator Pearce (for Australia). Accompanied by Sir l\faurice
Hankey, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Mousley, Col. Day, Mr. Flint.
France.-Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon.
Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal.
Mr. Pensot.
Italy.-Senator Schanzer, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral
Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count
Pagliano, Col. ·Asinari di Bernezzo.
Japan.-Admiral Baron Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Vice Admiral
Kato, Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi, Mr. Shiratori, l\fr. Sugimura.
The secretary general. Assisted by Mr. Cresson and 1\ir. Osborne. Mr. Camerlynck, interpreter.
1. The seventeenth meeting of the Committee on the Limitation
of Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American Union Building on Saturday, January 7, 1922, at 11 a. m.
2. There were present: For the United States, Mr. Hughes,
Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senatof Underwood, Col. Roosevelt,
Admiral Coontz; .for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee,
Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert
Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia) ; for
France, 1\ir. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon; for
Italy, Senafor Schanzer, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Acton;
for .Japan, Admiral Baron Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Vice Admiral
Kato, Capt. Uyeda.
3. Secretaries and technical advisors were present as follows:
For the United States, Mr. Wright,_ Mr. Clark; for the British
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Empire, Sir 1\_'[aurice Hankey, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Mousley, Col.
Day, l\Ir. Flint; for France, 1\ir. I(ammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt.
Odenl: hal, Mr. Ponsot; fo r Italy, l\llarquis Visconti-Venosta,
Count Pagliano, Col. Asinari di nernezzo; for Japan, Mr. Ichihasl).i, Mr. Shiratori, Mr. Sugimura. The secretary general, assisted by l\1r. Cresson and 1\ir. Osborne, was present. Mr. Camerlynck was present as interpreter.
The chairman, 1\:ir. Hughes ~ at the opening of the meeting, recognized Prince Tokugawa.
Prince Tokugawa said t hat it 'vas for an unpleasant purpose
that he arose to say a word. As some of the committee already
knew, he ·was about to take his leave of the conference; he was
starting that afternoon on his return journey to Tokyo to resume his responsibilities in Parliament, which had already .convened.
It was needless for him to say how greatly he appreciated the
courtesies 'vhich had been accorded to him by all the delegates
and for their cooperation in the work of the conference. That
work had already ach:.eved remarkable success and, as was
known, its full list of accomplishments was not yet completed.
In bidding to the members of the committee ~dieu, he wished
to say that he would always remember with gratification and
pride the unique privilege which he had had of sitting with them
and 'vould be delighted whenever their and his paths might cross
again.
The chairman said he was sure the members of the committee
would all deeply regret that Prince Tokugawa had to leave them.
They were indebted to him for h~s cooperation and he might be
assured of ·their abiding affection and esteem. He was leaving
the n1ost pleasant memories of his association with them in this
important work and the contribution that he had made personally
to the success of their efforts.
The chairman then suggested that the committee proceed with
the consideration of the resolution which had been presented wHh
respect to the abolition of the use of asphyxiating and other
poisonous gases in warfare. He then read the resolution, as
follows:
" The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases
and all analogous liquids, materials, or devices having been justly
condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a
prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which
a majority of the civilized po-wers are parties;
"No\V, to the end that ~this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience
a nd practice of n ations, the signatory powers declare their assent
t o such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby between themselves, and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto."
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1\lr. Sarraut said he rose to express his full and frank a llllerence to 1\lr. Root's resolution. Fron1 the first France had condemned the barbarous inventions and the abominable practices
introduced by Germany in the late war and the new methods
consisting in the use of gases, burning liquids, and poisonous
substances; the first thing the committee should do was officially
and solemnly to denounce those who had taken the initiative in
these things. All present should hope and work for the final disappearance from warfare of these infamous practices if, indeed,
other wars were to come-a thought which, he said, was abhorent
to him.
This mjght,"no doubt, be accomplished by setting an example to
the other countries. The reports of experts who had maturely
considered the question had indeed pointed out the extreme difficulty, if not impossibility, of taking practical precautions against
the threat and the use of these poiso!?- gases and these chemicals.
It 'vas an established and indisputable fact that those chemicals
which were used in the manufacture of gases and poisons were
the san1e that were used for innumerable ordinary substances
necessary to the industrial and peaceful life of the human race.
The reports of experts had established the in1possibility of
exercising an effective supervision over the production of gases
which might be used as weapons of war and hence the impossibility of preventing or limiting such production. This entailed,
as a logical consequence, the impossibility of preventing any country from arming itself in advance against the unfair use of those
gases which an unscrupulous enemy might secretly prepare for
sudden use upon an unprotected enemy, as had been clone during
the late war.
But, if the exercise of authority in the matter did not at the
moment appear practicable, the Root resolution was none the l~ss
a useful accomplishment because, in the first place, it would be·
a bond of union between the Powers here represented and, further, because their agreement and their example might be such
as to bring about the adherence of all the nations to the same
principles. It was necessary, indeed, that this adherence should
be unanimous in order that an effective and salutary result might
be obtained. But, in the meantime, the conference would have·
presented a great example possessing a not inconsiderable persuasive power, thus possibly preventing the repetition of certain
atrocities committed by certain belligerents during the late war.
It was 'vith this lofty and humane motive that the French delegation subscribed with all its heart to the Root resolution.
l\lr. Balfour said that as he understood the matt~r, the proposal before the meeting was the reaffirmation of the admitted
_principles of international law. In that sense there was nothing
new in the proposals made by Mr. Root. Indeed, on the ver;r-
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face of the document itself, it was pointed out that the greater
number of nations, in the various treaties which they had made
.subsequent to tile armistice, had explicitly or implicitly declared
that, in their view, the present proposal was already part of the
accepted law -of nations. He believed that the United States of
America, ~vho had not ratified those treaties, had made separate
treaties; but in those treaties also they had by implication afiirmed the present propcsal as part of the general law. Moreover,
he remembered that in 1\1arch, 1918, a declaration had b-een
made by all the allied and associated powers, in response to an
appeal made to them by the Red Cross Society, in which in explicit terms they had laid down the same doctrine. Behind· all
those forn1al acts ther~ Ju~_d been the findings of the two Hague
conferences -\vhich, although so far as he was aware were not
ratified by the United States of America, were accepted by all
the other powers engaged in those conferences, undoubtedly with
the sympathy although not with the explicit ratification of
America. TLerefore, he supposed he was right in saying that
t he document before them neither made nor professed to make
.any change in international" law.
It would be interesting to compare the procedure on this point
with that which had been adopted ·with regard to submarines.
'There also they had declared in very clear terms what they con·.ceive to be the law, and what undoubtedly was the law of nations
as regards attacks on merchant ships by ships of war. In that
-case they went further than it was now proposed to do, and
further than it was possible to go now, for they had made an
alteration and had proposed an extension of the law of nations.
'They had agreed among themselves t~ be bound by regul~tions
·which were in advance of the actual law of nations; and they had
.also altered the sanctions which lay behind the law of nations, in
that they introduced the fourth of Mr. Root's clauses which would
-convict the individuals who broke the law as guilty of piracy. So
that in dealing with submarines they had gone a good deal
·further than 'vas practicable in the present case. 'rhey could now
-d0 no more than reaffirm the law. It might be asked in the first case
what was the use of merely coming forward and reaffirming what
nobody denied? Personally he thought such a course was important and valuable, if all the lamentable occurrences of the late
war and all the developments which that war caused in the use
·of noxious gases were taken into account.
Of course, they must all admit, as Mr. Sarraut had well pointed
-out, that a mere affirmation of the law without adding any sanctions to it would not relieve the nations of the world from taking
_precautions against those who were prepared to break the law;
and who, if they were allowed to do so with impunity, might dominate the world by the mere indifference they showed to the laws
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which the world had endeavored to lay down. That was what
had actually occurred in 1915. In 1915, as in 1922, the present
proposal was the law <!f nations; and, because it was the law of
nations, no nation but one had taken any steps toward using
noxious gases, or had contemplated as part of their possible military operation that such gases should be used either by themselves
ov by their enem:es. The result had been very near to a complete
disaster for the Allied armies. The shock of that new weapon of
warfare had been wholly local, for the invention of science came
to the rescue, and finally the Allies and their unscrupulous enemy
fought out the war on equal terms.· That example unhappily
was now before them and could not be ignored. Their specialists
had pointed out in Washington, and an examination by a committee of the League of Nations had brought out a similar result at Geneva, that it was perfectly impossible so to arrange
matters that a nation bent upon doing so should not in times of
peace-whatever the rules of war might be-make such preparations as would enable it to use that monstrous and inhuman
method of warfare at its will if war broke out., They knew that
at least one great civilized nation had not thought it improper,
or at all events had chosen, whether proper or not, to break the
law of nations. That wretched example might unhappily be followed in the future; and therefore no nation could forget that it
was open to attack by unscrupulous enemies; no nation therefore
could forego that duty of examining how such attacks could be
properly dealt with and effectively met.
Again there 'vas a par3;llel in the case of the submarine. The
British Empire delegation had desired to abolish submarines, but
that was found impossible, and it was admittedly impossible to
stop the erection of works in which poison gases could be manufactured in unlimited quantities. The British Empire delegation
therefore had to say-and he "\vas sure they had the sympathy
around that table, for no dissentient voice had been raised-that if
submarines '\Vere allowed they had to contemplate as a conceivable
possibility that they would be misused, and that precautions would
have to be taken against such misuse. He believed that every
other nation recognized that unhappily submarines would remain
a necessity as in the case of poison and lethal gases. Therefore
the relief which such a resolution as this would give to the '\Vorld
in connection with poison gas would not be the complete relief
which they all desired ; it would not remove the anxieties and
preoccupations which the possible use of gas necessarily involves.
But were they therefore to say that they would do nothing? Were
tJ1ey therefore to say that resolutions such as that now before
tllem were useless? Were they therefore to say that it was an
empty form solemnly to repeat rules which were already accepted,
25882-23--14
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although they were not in a position by the establishment of new
sanctions absolutely to prevent their use by any nation unscrupulous enough to desire to use them? Those questions he would
answer in the negative. He believed that if by any action of
theirs on such an occasion as the present they could do something
to bring home to the consciences of mankind that poison gas was
not a form of warfare which civilized nations could tolerate, they
would be doing something important toward discouraging them.
No sanctions were provided in the present document; no sanctions could be provided there. But if anyone looked back even
upon the history of the late lamentable war, he would see, notably
in the great test case of the United States, that the gradual rising
of public indignation ·against some grossly .immoral use of the
weapons of vvar had had a profound influence upon the history of.
the world. He vvas quite sure that the moral indignation roused ·
in the consciences of the United States had had a most powerful
effect upon the whole trend of events. He thought that by the
present resolution, backed as it was by the consciences of the
civilized world, although there was no sanction laid down· in it, for
no sanction was possible, they 'vould in fact be creating a- sanction not formally but informally. He beiieved that the outraged
consciences of the world would rise in indignation and that any
nation would be very bold and very ill-advised, if, in the face of
that universal opinion, it deliberately violated the rules vvhich on
the present occasion they were invited deliberately to affirm.
Therefore, without committing himself to the actual language of
the resolution, he most heartily associated himself and also the
British Empire delegation 'vith the Policy which the American
delegation, through the mouth of Mr. Root, had put forward for
their acceptance.
Admiral Baron Kato said that the question of poison gases.had
been discussed fully and the opinions in regard to them were now
very weil known. He would not, therefore, take the committee's
time by repeating them ; he simply wished to express his approv.al,. on behalf of the Japanese delegation, of the resolution
presented by 1\fr. Root.
The chairman remarked that there seemed to be unanimity in
support of the resolution and added that, unless further discussion was desired, he would ask for the formal assent of the delegations to the resolution in the form in which he had read it.
The delegations being polled, each voted affirmatively, and the
chairman declared it unanimously adopted.
The chairman said that the next subject presented for the committee's consideration was the question of limitation of airrraft
a~ to numhers, character, and use.
It would he recalled that a subcommittee of experts to dPaJ
with thiR snbjec~t lHHl been appointed; that commiUee had made a
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careful, comprehensive, and somewhat voluminous report, which
had been distributed. In view of the fact that the members of the
committee all had this report before them, he assumed that it
would not b~ necessary to read it in extenso.· The question, he continued, was not presented for discussion; the desire was simply
to get· the report before the committee for such disposition as
they might desire; and in order that they might make. a beginning, he would simply refer to some of the main points of the
report. Whatever time was necessary for its full examination
and analysis would, of course, be afforded; it was not necessary
that the committee should proceed with the discussion of it,
which would not be continued until all the members of the committee were agreeable to that course.
Sir Robert Borden said that he would be grateful if the chairman would make as full an exposition of the report on the limitation· of aircraft as he was prepared to do. This would serve as
an introduction of the principal issues and would facilitate the
general understanding.
The chairman then briefly outlined, and read 'extracts from, the
following report :
" CO:MI\IITTEE ON AIRCRAFT-REPORT ON LIMITATION OF AIRCRAFT AS TO
NUMBERS, CHARACTE:&, AND USE,

"1. Fonn of proceclure.-In considering the limitation .of aircraft as to numbers, character,. and use, the Committee on Aircraft adopted a form of procedure which took up the various
questions involved in the following order: (1) Commercial aircraft; (2) civil aircraft; (3) military aircraft. Heavier-than-air
and lighter-than-air craft were considered separately, since the
conditions governing the two are not in all cases the same. An
effort was made to determine whether or not it is possible to impose limitations upon their (1) number, (2) character, (3) use,
and after discussion of the methods that might be employed to
effect such limitation, \vhether limitation was practicable or not.
This committee feels that the desirability of placing any limitations whatever upon aircraft is a matter of policy, one which it
is for the main committee itself to determine. Nevertheless, it
feels it to be a duty to point out the essential facts which will
hnse a decided bearing upon the determination of the proper policy
to be adopted, and· this is done in this report.
"2. C01nrnercial aircraft.-Different methods of imposing such
limitation may be adopted by different states. The precise
methods adopted by any state must be in conformity with its
organic la"\v. In some states it may be possible to impose an.
arbitrary limitation; in others, by the exercise of the police power,
or of the power to tax, a practical limitation may be enforced..
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In the United States, where laws passed by the Congress must
conform to the written Constitution of the country, there may be
some difficulty in finding an effective means of imposing this
limitation, but nevertheless it is believed that if necessary such
means can be found.
"3. Before discussing any other phase of the matter it will be
well to consider carefully the effects which would follow the
imposition of the limitation upon the numbers and character of
commercial aircraft which may be owned and operated by the
nationals of a state. In the first place, if commercial aeronautics
is allowed to follow the natural laws which have governed the
development of all other means of transportation and communication, the num,b er and character of such aircraft will probably
depend on financial considerations. That is, commercial aeronautics as a business will not thrive unless the operation of the
aircraft will return a substantial profit. The state may interfere
with the operation of these natural laws by granting to the
owners and operators of such aircraft a direct or indirect subsidy .
. By so doing enterprises which would not otherwise be financially
successful may be enabled to live and in this way the number of
ajrcraft used for commercial purposes will be greater than if
the natural laws of developl?ent had been allowed to take their
course.
"It is not easy to foresee what consequences to human progress
will come in the future from the development of aeronautics. in
all its branches. They will certainly be marvelous where natural
conditions are favorable to such development. To try to limit
them now with arbitrary laws, even if these laws have the
purpose of p1:eventing war, would be in the opinion of this committee disastrous from the point of view of world progress.
"4. If, among commercial aircraft, we class those owned and
9perated for sport or pleasure or convenience, the numbers of
these will depend largely upon the wealth of .the nation, upon the
inclination of the people toward aeronautics, upon the cost of the
a ircraft thus employed.
" 5. The development of aircraft has presented the world with
a new and improved means of transportation and communication.
One of the causes of warfare in the past has been a lack of the
proper distribution of the world's resources in raw material, food
products, and the like. Another potent cause of war has been the
lack of understanding between races, peoples, and nations. Any
addition to the transportation and communication facilities of
the world should operate to improve the distribution of resources
and likewise to lessen the causes of misunderstandings between
peoples, and thus lessen the causes of warfare. Any limitation,
therefore, placed upon comn1ercial aeronautics would haye the
effect of limiting a means of transportation and communication
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between the different parts of the smne state and between different states. It seems inconceivable that any limitation should
be imposed upon commercial aeronautics unless it were with the
avowed object of thereby limiting the air power of· a state and
thus decreasing the liability of war. Commercial aeronautics
with its attendant development of an aeronautical industry and
a personnel skilled in the manufacture, operation, and the maintenance of aircraft does furnish a basis of air power. The
development of commercial aeronautics and the development of a .
nation's air power are inseparable.
"6. Speaking broadly, all aircraft will be of some military value
no matter what restrictions may be placed upon their character.
Some can probably be converted with but few changes into military
aircrafts; others can be designed so that with major or minor
alterations, or even with none at all, they can be employed for
military purposes. As a matter of fact, the uses of aircraft in
war are many. During the vVorld War highly specialized types
were designed for special uses. Military aircraft have likewise
been developed to a degree of perfection not yet reached in commercial aircraft. It is quite reasonable to suppose that similar
development will take place in commercial aircraft, that they,
too, will be especially designed for the uses to be made of them,
and that they may depart quite radically from the military types
used in the vVorld War.
"In milit.a ry aircraft, as a rule, a premium is placed upon performance. Consideration of initial cost and cost of operation and
of maintenance are largely disregarded. The safety and convenience of the operators and passengers are co~sidered only as
these affect their ability to perform their military duties. If, as
seems evident, commercial aircraft must be specially designed for
the service they are to perform in order to have a chance of being
financially successful, any effort to provide for their conversion
into military craft will introduce complications which will increase the cost of production and operation. This may itself automatically act as a limitation, for business enterprises will not be
willing to have such conditions imposed unless they are compensated in some way for the extra cost.
"7. Heavier-than-air.-The war value of an airplane may be
said to lie in a combination of two or more of the following characteristics :
" (a) Its suitability for offensive and defensive equipment.
" (b) Its radius of action.
" (c) Its speed.
"-(d) Its carrying capacity.
" (e) The height it can attain.
"It is not desired to go too deeply into technical matters in this
report. The committee wishes, however, to point out that the
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peace value of aircraft is at present intimately bound up with the
general characteristics which make up the value of the airplane
in war. The last four of the characteristics enumerated above are
dependent upon the relation between the amount of fuel carried,
the horsepower of the engine, the lifting surface, and the total
'veight. The committee is of the opinion that formulae could be
evolved defining the inter-relationship of these factors in such a
way as to limit the war value of the machine built in conformity
therewith. It is more difficult to insure that war equipment
shall not be mounted in a commercial airplane. In this nwtter
the committee is of the opinion that definite rules can not be laid
down.
"Radius of actio'n is of high commercial value. A reliable air
service from Europe to America in, say 24 hours, should prove a
highly profitable undertaking. Again, in countries where there
is perhaps the greatest scope for the development of airways,
countries of great deserts for example, radius of action is essential. Speed is plainly the characteristic on which aircraft
rely to gain advantage in their competition with other means of
transportation." It is not yet comfort and security but timesaving that will tempt passengers, mail, and valuable cargoes from
old established services. To limit speed is to stop progress, to
throttle aviation in its infancy.
"The power of carrying numbers of passengers or quantities of
goods is of obvious commercial value and even the attainment of
considerable heights may eventually be a definite requirement.
As a matter of fact the success of recent experiments ind_icates
that, with special means of supercharging motors, navigation of
tLe air will in the future utilize high regions of the atmosphere
to take advantage of less resistance of the air and of favorable
high velocity winds.
"The factors which comprise' military' performance have therefore, a high commercial value, and it is the opinion of this committee that any limitation of the character of civil and commercial
aircraft must hinder the natural development of aviation; it is
probable that restriction as to character will have, in fact, an
even more adverse reaction on the progress of aviation than \Vould
be caused by a restriction on numbers.
"8. ll!ethod of limitation.-Aircraft can be limited as to number and character by an agreement arbitrarily fixing a maximum
number for each nation that will not be exceeded and by imposing
technical restrictions in such a way as to limit performance.
"9. The difference in organic· law as between nations will
probably prevent a single system of limitation being of universal
application. l\1oreover, the rules of formulre, whereby alone the
character of civil and commercial aircraft can be limited, must
be detailed and stringent. At the same time, they will be easy
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to evade, and infringement will not be obvious to the casual
glance. l\1easurements of horsepower, supporting surface, fuel
capacity, and weight will be necessary if security against evasion is to be insured by any other means than by trusting to the
good faith of the contracting parties. No State could consent to
having the nationals of another power continually inspecting all
of its manufacturing plants in order to ascertain whether the
l:!nitations it imposed we.::e being enforced.
"All these points received the closest of consideration with
reference to the limitation of Germany's airpower and the matter
is so complicated that the final drafting of the technical rules has
not yet been completed. But taking rules as drafted and even
assuming continuous inspection of a most stringent character,
it appears that there ar_e still loopholes for evasion. No rules
can prevent aircraft being designed in peace to permit of the
ready installment of larger tanks in war; engines can be made interchangeable, enabling one of higher power to be rapidly installed ; even carrying surface can be increased by the standardization and interchangeability of '\Vings and other methods, and
it is not impossible to conceive of civil and commercial aircraft
be~ng designed with a view to ultimate war requirements.
" 10. For the above reason, the committee is agreed that in the
present stage of development of aviation a universal limitation
by formul& of the character of commercial aircraft is impracticable.
"11. Question of subsidy.-Without expressing an opinion as
to the desirability of abolishing subsidies for the encouragement
of comn1ercial aviation, the committee points out that such
subsidies, direct or indirect, can have a great influence on the
character and number of commercial aircraft in relation to their
war value. In fact, subsidies will tend to decrease the natural
divergence between military and commercial aircraft and render
·the latter more readily ~daptable to war us~s. It is necessary,
ho·wever, to add that indirect subsidies or other encouragement
are most difficult to prevent, and even when acting in good faith
Governments of different nations will place clifferen t in terpretations on such encouragement.
"The question of wl:ether SlJ.bSidies are granted or not will
have great bearing upon development of commercial aircraft in
general, and ·will affect the future welfare of the nations. This
question, therefore, can not be determined frmn the point of view
solely of the adaptability for war uses.
"12. Civil aircraft.-In this discussion a distinction is drawn
tetweea commercial aircraft and clvil aircraft; the latter wlll
comp1·ise all aircrJ.ft operated by a State except those which it
or)erates in connection ·with its military enterprises. Oivil airCI"aft will, therefore, include ·any which are State-operated in
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t he customs service, for transporting the mails, the exercise of
its police powers, and the like. It is readily apparent that as
aircraft operate in a medium where there are no physical barriers, they can compete in some measure with every means of
transportation used on land or water. It !s therefore possible
for much of the transportation requirements of any State to
be met by the operation of aircraft. Such aircraft manifestly
are not dependent for their being upon their ability to be operated at a profit. The State will decide how best it may enforce
its laws, exercise its police power, transport State-o\vned merchandise or mails, and the means used will be those which are
most efficient and most economical from the standpoint of the
State itself. The cheapest ·will not always be the best or the most
satisfactory.
" The number. and the legitimate use of aircraft by any Government for such civil purposes will, therefore,. be limited only
by the estimate. placed upon the service which they can render
and by the consent of the people to raising by taxation the amount
of money which must be employed for their acquirement, operat ion, and maintenance.
" 13. If the civil agencies of a State use aircraft for police or
other purposes that are essentially military in · character this
class ·of civil aircraft should be discussed under the limitation
of military aircraft.
"14. The number and character of such civil aircraft can be
limited only by an arbitrary agreement among the States.
" 15. It ·would, ·again, be utterly impracticable to set up any
agency acting under authority other than that of a nation itself
to regulate the number of civil aircraft o·wned and operated by
the State.
LIGHTER-THAN-AIR CRAFT.

"16. Limitation of number and · character."""-The characteristics of lighter-than-air craft are sucl'l. that limitation of number and character presents little technical or practical difficulty.
It is a peculiarity of these craft that their effidency is very intimately bound up in their size. Small dirigibles have a war
value of their own, but it is limited and they can not be considered as offensive weapons. For example, a small vessel of this
kind can not attain any considerable height while carrying a
useful load, and even if filled with noninflammable gas its vulnerability to gunfire at the heights it could reach preclude its
being utilized for such purposes as aerial bombardment. Only
in large-size-d dirigibles can a useful load be carried to a reasonable military height at a fair speed. Limitation of size is therefore su!ficient to insure that lighter-than-air craft should be incapable of offensive aerial action. Moreover, the construction of
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large dirigibles requires large sh~d accommodation and can not
be kept secret; in this respect they resemble surface warships.
"17. It is therefore possible to regulate their numbers and
size by a simple system of international agreement, and infringement of such agreement can be readily detected without a detailed system of control.
"18. The committee is agreed that the possibilities of war use
for large dirigibles may still exist. AI though in the Ia ter stages
of the 'Vorld War it appeared as if the defense had the mastery
over attack in lighter-than-air craft, the introduction of larger
craft filled with noninflammable gas and carrying their own protective aeroplanes may again permit bombardments being carried
out by dirigibles.
"This committee desires, however, to draw attention to the
fact that dirigibles become increasingly efficient with increase of
size. Any limit which is imposed on the size of commercial dirigibles must shut the door on the possibility of their development
for legitimate civil enterprises.
" 19. Lin~itation of the use of aircraft.-The co'm mittee· is of the
opinion that it wo-uld be useless to attempt to lay down a rule
that civil and· commercial aircraft should not be us~d in war, as
they consider that no nation could deny itself the value for war
purposes of their commercial machines provided that they are
suitable for any warlike purposes. It is understood that when
so used they will be manned by service personnel of the State
and carry the proper distinguishing marks, and will in fact become war aircraft ; their use does not therefore require discussion in this part of the committee report.
"20. The use of civil and commercial aircraft in peace is governed by the International Air Convention, which amply safeguards a State's sovereignty in the air against abuse.
"21. This conv~ntion has already been ratified by Great Britain, France, Japan, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Serb-Croat and
Slovene State, and Siam. It will at a very near date come into
force for these various powers and later for the other signatory
States and also nonsignatory powers who desire to adhere to it.
"22. The committee is aware, however, that ·for certain reasons
the United States has not yet announced its adherence to this
convention. The committee therefore suggests for the consideration of the subcommittee on program and procedure that a convention covering the different phases of aerial navigation and
based upon the one ment:oned above could be drawn up at this
conference to which the assent of all powers represented could
be glYen. ~rhe committee further belieYe that this is most
desirable.
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" SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS.

"23. Civil and conunercial aircraft.-This committee understands that •the purpose of t"tlis conference is to promote peace and
to remove the causes of ·warfare. It must be understood distinctly that if the conference decided to limit the development of
commercial aircraft in order to retard the development of air
power the immediate result will be the retarded development of
means of transportation and communicntion, 'vhich will itself, if
unrestricted, largely act to bring about the same result, the
removal of some of the causes of warfare.
"24. This committee is unanimously of the opinion that in the
present state of development of aeronautics there is a technical
possibility of the limitation of numbers, character, and use of
civil and commercial aireraft with regard to their utilization in
war; they are,· however, agreed that such limitation of numbers,
and especially of character, is not practicable, except in the case
of lighter-than-air craft of above a certa:n displacement.
"25. As regards the desirability of limitations, the committee
has touched on those factors which must be understood before
arriving at a decision. It feels it to be a duty to lay great stress
upon the follo·wing fact, which ·will have a decided bearing upon
any determination of the proper policy to be adopted: Any limitation as to number and character of civil and commercial aircraft,
heavier than air or lighter than air, which is efficacious to hinder
their utility for war purposes must interfere disastrously with
the natural development of aeronautics for legitimate civil and
commercial enterprises. To limit the science of aeronautics in its
present state is to shut the door on progress. It is for the conference to decide whether the limitations ·which can with diffieulty be devised and imposed are to. be adopted at Sl!Ch a cost.
"Military aircratt.-(Note. In the part of the report 'vhich follows the word 'military ' is used in its widest sense to denote
' pertaining to the fighting services, whether :naval, military, or
air.')
"26. Prelim"inary remarks.-The committee agreed that before
·e ntering upon a discussion of possible limitation of the numbers
of military aircraft it was desirable ·that the present relative
strength of the nations represented should be ascertained and
tabulated in a simple form designated to fac:litate comparison
between them. The results 'of this inyestigation are tabulated in
appendixes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, attached to this report. It is remarked
that though these forins afford· a guide to the relative military
air strengths at the present day, it is impracticable to present a
complete estimate of a nation's air power, since air power is (as
bas been already shown) intimately bound up in factors other
than the military establishment. Differences in organizat:on and
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administration of the ·various national aerial forces are a further
obstacle to dir(?ct comparison in detail ; these factors must not be
forgotten when studying the statement presented and must be
kept in the foreground of all discussions as to the possibility of
limitation.
"27. As to number.-The limitation of the number of military
aircraft presents from one point of view less difficulty than the
similar problem in the case of commercial aircraft. It is obvious
that if a limitation on the number of military aircraft is agreed
upon between nations, it can be imposed by a state withou·t that
interference with the liberty of citizens which compl~cates the
question of aircraft devoted to commercial pursuits. But when
the details of such an agreement are considered, it will be found
a matter of great difficulty to find a reasonable basis on which
the allotment of relative strengths cai1 be made. For example: ·
"(i) The 'status quo' cannot serve as a starting point, since
the state of development of air services differs widely in the case
of the various pO'iYers (see appendixes), and in no case can these
services be considered as complete.
.
"(ii) The size of a nation's navy and army will influence the
hasis, in so far as aircraft are essential auxiliaries to those
services.
" (iii) National p·olicy will differ as between nations: some natiO:QS, for example, will wish to have large air forces for coast
defence where others prefer to trust to older methods. Development on the lines of the substitution of air forces for other forms
of force are likely to be considerable.
"(iv) The potentialities of air forces in policing and garrisoning
semicivilized countries or uncivilized countries, are as yet only
partially realized. The number of aircraft required for such
duties will vary with the size and nature of the territories to be
patrolled and with the value placed on their services by different
nations.
"(v) The geographical position and peculiarities of a state, the
situation and strength of its possible enen1ies, and the nature of a
possible attack must influence the number of aircraft it will desire
to maintain.
"(vi) Different terms of. service for personnel will influence the
effectiveness of air services and the size of the reserve.
" (vii) The state of development or possibilities for civil aeronautics will have, as has been shown above, a direct bearing on the
number of military aircraft which it may be desirable for a state
to maintain.
"The problem of finding a suitable ratio between the air forces
of various powers is thus at the present time almost insuperable.
"28. As to character.-But eYen should it lJe possible to fix the
ratio, such a limitation would be of little value without some lin1it

••
212

:METHODS OF LIMITATION.

as to the character of the aircraft. Whe:p the question of limitation of naval armaments was considered by the conference it was
found necessary to limit the displacement of individual ships as
well as the total tonnage. In the absence of similar provision the
limitation of numbers of aircraft would only result in competitive
building of aircraft of greater and greater power and size. The
methods of limitation must therefore attempt to legislate for both
number and character.
"HEAVIER-THAN-AIR.

"29. :JI etlwds of limitation.-The following methods may be
employed:
"First. The limitation of the number of military aircraft.
"Second. The limitation of the amount of horsepower for military aircraft.
"Third. The limitation of the lift tonnage for military aircraft.
"Fourth. The limitation of personnel for military aircraft.
"Fifth. The limitation of military aircraft budgets.
" These five methods may be applied in combination or singly
and are considered in detail below :
"30. Limitation of the number of aircraft is the most obvious
method of limiting the strength of the aviation force, but in attempting to apply this method the question of size and type at
once arises. It might be necessary to limit the maximum wing
surface permitted to a single aircraft or it might be necessary
to prescribe the number of aircraft in each of the type groups,
such as combat planes, bombing planes, etc.; this question of definition of type presents great difficulty. In order to make an
effective limitation of the numbers of military aircraft to be maintained in peace time by any nation, it will be necessary to have
a detailed understanding on the following points:
"(1) On the number and types actually in use by organized
.aerial units.
" (2) On the number and types held in reserve.
"(3) On the number and type of engines held in reserve.
" ( 4) On the replacement of planes crashed, worn out, or replaced by later models. In the case of obsolete and other planes
that are replaced by other models it would be necessary to enter
into an agreement regarding the disposal of planes so replaced.
Otherwise it would be possible to build up an unlimited war reserve merely by classifying the plane~ so held as obsolete, or by
converting them into civil or commercial planes.
"(5) On the limitation of the ·adoption of new and more powerful types.
"All these points will present great difficulty in an age when
aircraft can become obsolete in a few months, and when their
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nature is such that war wastage may be as high as 200 per cent
per month.
"31. The second n1ethod of limitation, limitation of horsepower,
may apply to:
" ( 1) Total horsepower in assembled planes.
"(2) Total horsepower in assembled engines.
"(3) Horsepower in a single fndividual plane of a given type.
".This can only be based on the cubic capacity of the engines;
there will be no guaranty that a nation has not discovered a secret
which will enable greater horsepower to be got out of limited
capacity, nor is it reasonable to expect any nation to disclose such
a secret. The more detailed the limitation the greater the administrative difficulty of enforcement, particularly under present conditions, when administrative methods are so widely different, and,
as pointed out in the first part of the report, any enforcement, to
be effectual, would entail such detailed inspection by a fore:gn
commission as to be intolerable to any nation.
" 32. The third method of limitation, limitation of lift tonnage,
may apply to :
" ( 1) Total lift tonnage in assembled planes.
• " ( 2) Total lift tonnage in all planes assembled or not assembled.
"(3) Lift tonnage of a single individual plane of a given type.
"Any method must presumably be based 0n wing area and horsepo\ver. It has been mentioned that the actual horsepower may be
unkno\vn, and it is likewise conceivable that a nation may discover
a wing shape of extreme lifting efficiency and neglect to disclose
the fact. Limitation of lift tonnage may therefore be wholly
illusory, and the remarks as to inspection made in the last paragraph apply to this method also.
"33. The fourth method of limitation, whether of the total or
organized personnel for war aircraft or only of pilots in the permanent mil~tary establishment, fails by reason of the difference in
organization between different states. A nation which has a separate air service has to include in its organized personnel those employed in recruiting, supply, transport, administrative headquarters; etc. In the case of nations whose air forces are, contained
in their naval and military forces, supply, etc., personnel are included in naval and military establishments; a fair comparison
can not therefore be made. Moreover, the difference in terms of
service, long or short, voluntary service or conscription, must
introduce incalculable factors which directly affect the efficiency
of organized air forces and the size and efficiency of the reserve.
"34. The fifth method of limitation, limitation by means of
limiting the budget and thereby controlling the amount of money
that may be expended annually for aviation, seems simple in
theory, but it is difficult of application. The various methods of
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distributing budgets for material under different subheads make it
impracticable to determine or compare the actual sums expended
exclusively for aircraft, and the question is at present further
complicated by the factor of the relative purchasing power of the
currency of various nations.
"35. Of the five methods of limitation, limitation by lift tonnage or horsepower appears to pr~sent the least objections ; _but to
make these or any other methods effective, it ·would be necessary,
as previously. pointed out, to organize a system of international
inspections. Any system of international inspection would oe
almost certain to arouse ill-feeling and would tend to cause friction rather than to insure harmony and good feeling between
friendly powers.
"36. Impracticability of limitation of nu1nber and character.Objections in detail to each suggested method of .limitation have·
been advanced above-there is one insuperable objection which is
common to every method,_ namely, the close relationship which at
present exists between civil or commercial aeronautics and air
power. Unless civil and commercial aeronautics are strictly
limited-and it has been shown in the early par~ of this report
that it is not practicable to limit them-a nation desiring air
power in excess of the limit imposed or agreed to will develop its
civil and commercial aeronautics to any extent desired.
"Granting a flourishing aeronautical industry, the number of the·
present type of perishable military airplanes active on any given
date is only one of the elements of air power. During the war a
single American firm contracted to - deliver 100 aircraft a day,.
and the output of engines can be organized on a similar scale.
A nation's air po,ver can thus be multiplied not only by the actual
number of civil and commercial aircraft in ·use but also by the
capacity of the industry to turn to the manufacture of military
aircraft in large quantities. Limitation of the number of horsepower and lift tonnage would under such conditions prove·
illusory. This commercial industry will further provide a great
potential reserve of pilots and skilled technical personnel and will
thus discount to a great extent any limitation of numbers of the·
personnel of military aviation.
"37. It is the opinion of this committee that the limitation
of n1ilitary air povirer (as regards heavier-than-air craft) is not
practicable at the present time. Their reasons for this decision
are as follows:
" (I) The difficulty of finding a basis for the proportion of air. .
craft to ·be allotted to the various nations.
· " (II) The difficulty of devising technical methods to irr:lJ;)Osesuch limitation.
" (III) The difficulty of enforcing such methods.
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" ( l V) The interdependence between air power and a commercial aircraft industry which it is not practicable to limit.
"38. Lighter-than-air cratt.-Many of the remarks already
made apply to lighter-than-air craft but, as in the case of commercial aircraft of this nature, limitation is both possible and
practicable. It is unnecessary to recapitulate the argument that
the military value of a dirigible is dependent on its size, and the
size of dirigibles and the number maintained can be limited by
agreement of a few simple rules.· Infraction of such rules can
be rapidly ascertained without detailed inspection. But such a
limitation of lighter-than-air aviation forces would not effect a
limitation of this kind of air power of a nation unless a limitation were also imposed on- its lighter-than-air commercial activities. The line of demarcation between the large commercial
airship and the military airship is very slight, and a commercial
dirigible would require little, if any, alteration in order to adapt
it to military purposes. The objections to the limitation of the
number or character of commercial lighter-than-air craft have
already been remarked on.
"The question of the use of military aircraft.
"39. It is necessary in the interests of humanity and to lessen
the chances of international friction that the rules which should
govern the use of aircraft in war. should be codified and be made
the subject of international agreement.
"40. The matter has been considered by this committee in connection with a draft code of "Rules for Aircraft in War" submitted for remarks by the committee on the laws of war. The
subject appears to the committee to be one of extreme importance
and oiie which raises far-reaching problems, legal, political, commercial, and military; it requires, therefore, exhaustive discussion by a single committee in which experts on all these issues are
assembled.
"The representatives of the United States and Japan on this
committee are prepared to discuss the rules submitted from a.
technical point of view as provided for in the agenda under paragraph on limitation of new types of military arms, but the representatives of Great Britain, France, and Italy are not so prepared.
They state that the time between receipt of the agenda for the
conference and their date of sailing has not permitted that exhaustive discussion of the subject that would enable them to
advance a national viewpoint on a matter which affects so many
and varied interests. In some cases the national policy has not
yet been determined.
"41. This committee recommends therefore that the question of
the rules for aircraft in war be not considered at a conference
in which all the members are not prepared to discuss so large
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a subject, but that the matter be postponed to a further conference 'vhich it is recommended be assembled for the purpose at a
date and place to be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.
" SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS ARRIVED AT BY THE COMMITTEE ON NUMBER, CHARACTER, AND USE OF AIRCRAFT.

"42. The commitfee are agreed that among the more important
elements which influence the power that a nation may exert by
means of aircraft are the following :
"(1) The adaptability of its people to aeronautics.
"(2) Geographic location and characteristics of the territory
occupied by the nation and its dependencies.
" ( 3) The ability to produce and maintain aircraft and accessories.
" ( 4) The amount and character of aeronautical activity outside
the military establishment, such as commercial and civil aeronautical activities, and sport and pleasure flying.
" ( 5) The size and efficiency of its air establishment for
military purposes, consisting of (a) the active establishment,
including permanent headquarters, bureaus, squadrons, schools,
technical establishments, depots of material and personnel, etc.;
(b) the reserve establishment, including organized and unorganized reserve personnel and war reserve of material.
"43. (1) The adaptability of a nation to aeronautics.
"Interest of the general public in aeronautics seems to be
inherent in some nations; in others it is dormant or almost
lacking. The confidence of a people in aeronautics in general is
undoubtedly a factor worthy of serious consideration when
estimating the air power of that country. It ls possible that a
far-seeing Government may stimulate the interest of its general
public in aeronautics by exhibitions, general educational measures, and by the encouragement in a finandal way of individuals
already interested, and thus increase the adaptability of its
people to aeronautics.
"44. (2) Geographic location and characteristics of the territory occupied by the national and its dependencies.
" This may be looked on as clos~ly akin to ( 1) . The physical
characteristics of a country will have a considerable influence on
the attitude taken by its inhabitants toward aviation. It is
obvious that, while government action may improve the natural
character.istics of a country to a certain degree, by making aerodomes, etc., it is not possible for any limitation of such action
to be made except by limiting the total amount spent by the
nation on aviation, a method \vhich has already been shown
to be largely ineffective.
"45. (3) The ability to produce and maintain aircraft and
accessories.
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"The maximum aeronautical industry possible for a nation t o
build up under ideal conditions is determined by (1) the extent t o
which manufacturing in general is carried on; (2) by the character
of articles manufactured; (3) by the manufacturing methods in
general-that is, whether articles are manufactured. by machinery
or by hand; ( 4) the supply and availability of essential raw
materials. In the manufacture of many articles the raw materials
used and the manufacturing methods are similar to those employed in the manufac'h1re of aircraft and accessories. The
amount of this class of manufacturing carried on in any country
is an e3sential factor in estimating the ability of a nation to
produce aircraft.
" The ability to expand an existing aeronautical in,dustry rapidly enough to meet war conditions is one of the most important
elements of air po,Yer. This may be estimated by (1) the number of individuals skilled in the manufacture of air craft and
accessories; (2) the number of ·individuals whose training in
industries similar to the aeronautical industry·~ fonns a basis for
learning readily and rapidly the special problems encountered in
the manufacture of aircraft and accessories; (3) the size and
condition of the existing aeronautical industries and the size
and numl1er of manufacturing COl1cerns that can readily be converted to the manufacture of aircraft and accessories; ( 4) the
existence of a definite program previously determined upon and
the extent to which orders have been previously placed in anticipation of an emergency with a consequent perfection of plans;
(5) the amount and state of availability of the essential raw
materials; (6) tl~e quantity of available jigs, tools, dies, and production drawings for going into quantity production of standard
equipment.
"46. ( 4) The amount and character of aeronautical activity
outside the military establishment has been exhaustively discussed under the limitation of ciYil and commercial aircraft. It
has been shown that this is intimately bound up with (1) (~)
and (3), as above, and that, 'vith the exception of lighter-thanair craft of above a certain size, it is not practicable to limit it
except perhaps by limiting the amount of subsidies to commercial
aviation, a method which has been shown to be difficult of application and to be otherwise objectionable. It has also been
shown that the limitation of lighter-than-air craft would have
a disastrous effect on aviation.
"47. (5) Existing establishment of aircraft used for n1ilitary
purposes and the reserve.
" The size of the organized reserve will depend upon the size
of the military establishment and the rate at which the menlber~ of the military establishment are trained and returned to
25882-23' -1:)
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civil pursuits. Any reduction in the permanent peace-time establishment will carry with it a consequent reduction in organized
and trained reserves. There is, however, a type of personnel
whose civil pursuits fit them for immediate service in the air
establishment. This class is 1nade up by those engaged in commercial and civil aeronautics and industrial pursuits which require the same trades and basic knowledge and experience as is
required in the operation and maintenan...ce of military aircraft.
This class will not be seriously affected by any change in the
military estabJishment.
"48. Technical considerations have led the committee to the
conclusion that the limitation of the fifth element, namely, the
size and efficiency of peace-time air establishments for military
purposes (including the active establishment and the organized
reserve), although theoretically possible, is not practicable. The
committee also desires to lay stress on the fact that, even if such
limitation was pr ~!ticable, · it would not prevent the use of air
power in war, but ~ould only operate to give greater comparative
importance to the other elements of s.ir power which can not be
limited for the reasons given in the report.
"FINAL CONCLUSION.

•

"Nun~lJer and character.-The committee is of the op1n1on that
it is not practicable to impose any effective limitations upon the
numbers or characteristics of aircraft, either commercial or military, excepting in the single case of lighter-than-air craft.
"Use.-The committee is of the opinion that the use of aircraft
in war should be governed by the rules of warfare as adapted to
aircraft by a ful'ther conference which should be held at a later
date.
"Respectfully submitted by committee on aircraft.
" For the United States of America:

.

Chairman,
"Rear Admiral, United States Navy.
MASON J\:1. pATRICK,
"Major General, United States Army.

"WILLIAM A. l\r1oFFETT,

"

" For the British Empire:
" J. F.

A. HIGGINS,

''Air Vice Marshal, R. A. F.

" For France :

Capitaine,
"Pilot Aviateur, French Army.

"ALBERT RoPER,

" For Italy :
" RICCARDO Morzo,
'

.'-

" Colonel, R. I . A.

" For Japan:
" 0SAMI NAGANO,

" Captain, I. J. N.
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"NoTE.-The Italian representative lwlieves anu desires to
place on record that one way in which it would be possible to
limit the air power of a nation would be by placing a limit upon
the number of pilots in the permanent military establishment and
consequently agrees with tlle general reasoning of the report in
so far as is not contrary to this opinion.
'•':1
" (Signed)
Cor.... R. Mo1zo,
" RICCARDO MoziO,
"Colonel, R. I. A."
The chairman sa:d that the report was now before the committee for such action as might be deemed advisable.
l\fr. San·aut said that the report would have to be translated,
and the reading of it alone would take some time; the subject
was not on the agenda. lie believed that he voiced the opinion
of llis colleagues on the committee as well as h:s own in saying
that under the conditions it would be advisable to afford time for
the necessary examination of the contents of the report.
The chairman said that, in view of the very short time there had
been for the ~xamination of the voluminous report, he thought
that abundant time should be given for its consideration; he had
taken it up that morning merely because other subjects had been
disposed of, and he thought that even a general statement might
aid the committee in making progress with its work. He was
not aware that the committee was prepared to take up another
matter at that time, and he therefore suggested that, if that was
agreeable to the committee, adjournment be taken until Monday.
Lord Lee asked whether the chairman would give some indication of what subject would. be discussed after the report on aircraft; from present indications the consideration of this report
would take only a short time, and the British delegation would
like to be prepared for what was to follow.
'l'he chairman said that three subcommittees had been appointed,
one on gas, one on aircraft, and one on rules for the conduct of
Yrar. The committee had dealt with the report on gas and adopted
a resolution; it had had before it the report on aircraft. He
understood that the subcommittee on rules of war believed that
it \vould be impracticable, at this conference, to do more than
suggest that these should be careful.ly examined and made the
subject of consideration at another conference. If that was the
sense of the conference, anu no extended examination of the question was to be made, he supposed that the next order of business
would be the consideration of the report of the details of the proposed naval treaty, with respect to all the matters which were
then engaging the attention of the naval experts and the legal
experts. He was unable to say whether that would be ready for
the next session or not. He assumed that it was the next topic
I
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to be taken up, if it 'vas decided not to discuss rules for the conduct of war.
Mr. Balfour said that he had listened with great satisfaction to
Mr. Hughes's observations on the report. As concerned a general
revision of the rules of warfare, he said he was afraid he must discourage any attempt to deal with that tremendQus subject. He
was in some doubt as to whether it came within the list of subjects which his Government had authorized him to discuss; but
however this n1ight be, he thought that all his colleagues would
ce wise to limit their ambitions in this direction as close~y as
he did.
Sir Robert Borden said he had been much impressed with the
suggestion of Lord Lee on a l)revious occasion that, should another
great war break out, questions raised by the illegal use of submarines might arise concerning the use of aircraft in connection with
the search, seizure, and capt.ure of merchant vessels. Sir Robert
Borden merely wished to remind his colleagues of this point without even suggesting that it should be considered by this conference.
But the subject was, in one sense, connected with the conditions
under which merchant ships might be ordered to stop and might
be searched, seized, and eYentually captured. This might be done
b;v aircraft in the next war; in the last war it had been governed
byII the rules as they were then understood, which had not been
conformed to "-by one nation. If no principles were formulated,
the powers _might be confronted 'vith the same problems with
I"espect to aircraft.
Lord Lee said that he was well aware of the importance of the
point raised by Sir Robert Borden and that, in fact, it was the
point he himself had brought to the notice of the conference. He
supposed, how~ver, that it would be in order for it to come under
the second of the final conclusions of the report on the limitation
of aircraft. If this conclusion should be accepted by the committe~, as Lord Lee assun1ed it probably would be, then the matter
would go over to the further conference suggested therein-a
course which he would not oppose.
Senator Schanzer said he desired to add a few words in the
same connection as those of Sir Robert Borden. The conclusion
reached by the subcommittee of experts was that the conference
should not attempt to fix rules ·for aircraft, and that this question
should be referrep to a future conference. He had at the present
time no formal proposition to present, but he thought the matter
ought to be discussed. He was_ entirely in accord with Mr. Balfour, that the conference should_ not attempt to pass on the vast
subject of the laws of war, as time did not permit of this; but it
was impossible not to consider the fact that certain laws previously made-such as those contained in Mr. Root's resolutions re-
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garding submarines-had been reaffirmed at this conferen<:e; in
the same resolutions the powers represented on the committee had
stigmatized the abuses of the submarine and ha<l e3tabl shed Hrrnctions.
It was impossible to forget the excesses committed by
military means by the bombardm"ent of open towns "'i n Italy during the recent war. This had been forbidden by The Hague convention and, just as the com.mittee had thought it necessary to
condemn excesses committed in connection with submarine warfare, would it not be helpful to condemn the excesses committed
in connection with the bombing of open towns? He did not
knc'v whether it was proper to suggest such a proposition at that
time, but he thought that there should be a discussion of the
matter for t]1e purpose of ascer~aining whether a resolution forbidding the bombardment from the air of open towns and villages
could not be formulated .
. TLe chairman said that if it were proposed to discuss the question of rules of war, except possibly in a very limited sphere, the
committee would enter upon a field which, he assumed, would
give it a great deal of concern and would require prolonged study
and discussion. He did not suggest that the committee ·should
not enter upon that field if the delegates desired that these subjects should be taken up. He supposed that the report on aircraft could be dealt 'vith, in its main features, in a comparatively
short time. The report was voluminous, but that very fact led
to an easy c9mprehension of the recommendations. If it was
desired, in connection with the use of aircraft-for example, in
relation to merchant ships and undefended towns-to bring forward specific resolutions, there would be opportunity to do so.
He suggested, however, that the committee adjourn until Monday at 11 o'clock, and that it then proceed with the discussion
o:( the aircraft report. If anything else was ready, when that
had been disposed of, the committee would take it up.
The committee then adjourned until Monday, January 9, 1922,
at 11 o'clck a. m.
EIGHTEENTH MEETING-MONDAY, JANUARY 9, 1922, 11 A. M.
PRESENT.

United States.-~1r. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator

Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by
l\Ir. 'Vright, ~1r. Clark.
British Empire.-l\1r. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes,
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada),
Senator Pearce (fo·r Australia), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompan:ed by Sir ~Ia urice Hankey, Air l\1arshal Higgins, Capt. Domvile, ~1r. l\1aJkin, ~Ir. Flint, l\1r. Christie.

